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INTRODUCTION 
Mr. Donald Wagner, a professor at North Park University in Chicago, 
refinanced his fixed rate mortgage in March of 2005 to assist his daughter 
with her college tuition.1  Mr. Wagner‘s broker did not inform him that his 
interest rate would rise dramatically only one month after refinancing.2  As 
a result of his pay option adjustable rate mortgage,3 the principal of his loan 
has increased by $15,000 over the last two and a half years.4  Mr. Wagner 
has been forced to borrow against his pension and 401(k) in order to make 
payments, and, to make matters worse, last summer he discovered that his 
loan includes a $12,000 prepayment penalty.5  He now spends over sixty 
percent of his income on his mortgage payment, and states, ―[I]t‘s only 
 
 1 Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide Subpoenaed by Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2007, at C1. 
 2 Id. 
 3 ―These loans allow borrowers to pay only a fraction of the interest owed and none of the prin-
cipal, resulting in a growing rather than a shrinking mortgage balance.‖  Id.  For further discussion of 
negative amortization see infra Part I.B.6. 
 4 Morgenson, supra note 1. 
 5 Id.   For further discussion of prepayment penalties, see infra Part I.B.4. 
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[for] so long that I can do that.‖6  Unfortunately, Mr. Wagner‘s story is not 
unique.7 
Homeownership has long been the foundation of the American 
Dream,8 but in recent years this dream has been cut short for many Ameri-
cans.9  In 2006 there were over 1.2 million residential foreclosures across 
the United States.10  That is more than one foreclosure per minute.11  This 
was a dramatic rise from the number of foreclosures in 2005, and numbers 
did not slow in 2007.12  In November of 2007 alone there were a total of 
201,950 foreclosure filings, the equivalent of one foreclosure for every 617 
households across the country, a sixty-eight percent increase from number 
of foreclosures in November of 2006.13  An overwhelming number of these 
foreclosures are attributable to subprime mortgages.14 
It is estimated that ―[a]t least one out of five subprime loans will end 
in foreclosure—representing the highest rate of U.S. foreclosures since the 
Great Depression.‖15  These statistics prove that action needs to be taken in 
 
 6 Morgenson, supra note 1. 
 7 ―Countrywide, the nation‘s largest mortgage lender and loan servicer, is coming under in-
creased scrutiny as the home loan crisis deeps.‖  Id.  The Illinois Attorney General recently subpoenaed 
Countrywide documents ―as part of the state‘s expanding inquiry into dubious lending practices that 
have trapped borrowers in high-cost mortgages they can no longer afford.‖  Id. 
 8 ―Owning a home has always been at the center of the American Dream.‖  George W. Bush, 
President of the United States, President Bush Discusses Homeownership Financing, Address at the 
Rose Garden, (Aug. 31, 2007), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi? 
dbname=2007_presidential_documents&docid=pd03se07_txt-23.pdf. 
 9 See Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in Sheep’s Clothing: A Legislative 
Proposal, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129, 133 (2005). 
 10 ASS‘N OF CMTY. ORGS. FOR REFORM NOW, HOME INSECURITY: FORECLOSURES IN MIAMI-
DADE COUNTY NEIGHBORHOODS 2 (2007), available at http://acorn.org/fileadmin/Reports/FL_Miami_ 
Dade_County.pdf. 
 11 Id. 
 12 RealtyTrac, the publisher of the largest database of pre-foreclosure and foreclosures properties, 
reports that in 2006, there were 1,259,118 residential foreclosures in the United States.  This is ―up 42 
percent from 2005 and [is at] a foreclosure rate of one foreclosure filing for every 92 U.S. households.‖  
Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, More Than 1.2 Million Foreclosure Filings Reported in 2006, (Jan. 25, 
2006), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=1855 
&accnt=64847; see also John W. Schoen, Spike in Foreclosures: Sen. Schumer Urges Federal Bailout 
Worth ‘Hundreds of Millions’ of Dollars, MSNBC, Apr. 12, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 
18059004/. 
 13 Press Release, Realtytrac.com, Foreclosure Activity Decreases 10 Percent in November (Dec. 
19, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID= 
3797. 
 14 A study published by the Center for Responsible Lending in December 2006, found that ―one 
out of five (19 percent) subprime mortgages originated during the past two years [2005 and 2006] will 
end in foreclosure.‖  ELLEN SCHLOEMER ET AL., LOSING GROUND: FORECLOSURES IN THE SUBPRIME 
MARKET AND THEIR COST TO HOMEOWNERS 3 (2006), available at http://www.responsible 
lending.org/pdfs/foreclosure-paper-report-2-17.pdf. 
 15 Center for Responsible Lending, Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, http://www.responsible 
lending.org/issues/mortgage/subprime-mortgage-crisis.html (last visited April 5, 2008).  The subprime 
mortgage crisis has become so dire that, on January 10, 2008, Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve, ―signaled the bank‘s willingness to lower interest rates to prevent housing and credit prob-
lems from causing a U.S. recession.‖  Lorrie Grant, Fed ‘Stands Ready’ to Avoid Economic Recession, 
NPR.org, Jan. 10, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=17993667.  Currently, 
the Federal Reserve reports that ―[a]bout 21 percent of subprime adjustable rate mortgages are 90 days 
or more delinquent, and foreclosure rates are rising sharply . . . .‖  Id.  As a result, ―[s]ome 2 million 
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order to cure the current foreclosure epidemic, and that steps must be taken 
in order to prevent history from repeating itself in the future.  Educating the 
public in order to reform the subprime mortgage industry is not an entirely 
new concept,16 but given the amount of foreclosures that took place in 2006 
and 2007, and those looming on the not so distant horizon, it is time that 
this idea is revisited.17 
Foreclosures directly impact the lives of the families‘ whose homes 
are being foreclosed,18 and cause these families severe emotional and fi-
nancial trauma.19  ―For most homeowners, equity in a home represents a 
significant bulk of the resources accumulated over a lifetime.‖20  The da-
maging effects of foreclosures are also experienced by the community as a 
whole.21  Increased foreclosures can transform a once thriving community 
into an abandoned area.22  If there is a concentration of foreclosures in a 
single community the result is ―a decrease in overall property values, an in-
crease in crime, and a corresponding need for greater law enforcement and 
other government services.‖23  Due to these negative consequences asso-
 
homeowners are due to have their adjustable rate mortgages, or ARMs, reset over the next year and risk 
losing their homes.‖  Id. 
 16 See Stark, supra note 9, at 130. 
 17 On September 18, 2007, RealtyTrac reported that, in August 2007, there were 239,851 foreclo-
sure filings.  This number is 37 percent higher than July of 2007, and 112 percent higher than August of 
2006.  ―This is the highest number of foreclosure filings in a single month that RealtyTrac has reported 
since it began issuing the monthly report in January of 2005.‖  Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, Foreclo-
sure Activity Increases 37 Percent in August (Sept. 8, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/Content 
Management/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID=9&ItemID=3222&accnt=64847.  James J. Saccacio, Real-
tyTrac‘s CEO commented, ―The jump in foreclosure filings this month might be the beginning of the 
next wave of increased foreclosure activity, as a large number of subprime adjustable rate loans are be-
ginning to reset now.‖  Id. 
 18 ―[A] predatory loan that results in a foreclosure can be a devastating event in the life of an in-
dividual subprime borrower.‖  Siddhartha Venkatesan, Abrogating the Holder in Due Course Doctrine 
in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL‘Y 177, 208 (2003). 
 19 Baher Azmy & David Reiss, Modeling a Response to Predatory Lending:  The New Jersey 
Home Ownership Security Act of 2002, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 645, 663 (2004); Kurt Eggert, Held up in Due 
Course:  Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 503, 581 (2002). 
 20 Venkatesan, supra note 18, at 208.  ―[H]omes represent Americans‘ largest financial as-
set . . . .‖  Nathalie Martin & Ocean Tama y Sweet, Mind Games:  Rethinking BAPCPA’s Debtor Edu-
cation Provisions, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 517, 521 (2007). 
 21 Venkatesan, supra note 18, at 208; Eggert, supra note 19, at 582; Azmy & Reiss, supra note 
19, at 663.  ―Whole communities have been adversely affected by the phenomenon of predatory lending 
because aggressive mortgage brokers target specific neighborhoods within which to market these high-
cost home loans, and the subsequent foreclosures in these areas have led to rows of boarded up homes 
being inhabited by gangs and drug dealers.‖  Stark, supra note 9, at 130. 
 22 See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 663. 
 23 Id.  ―Neighborhoods become vulnerable . . . .  Abandoned homes become targets for drug deal-
ers and arson. . . .  The need for police and fire services rises in relation to neighborhood decline, further 
burdening city resources.  The increased costs for city services directly affects the proprietary interests 
of cities.‖  Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing?  Redressing the Externalities of Predatory 
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355, 375–76 (2006).  In August of 2007, over 18,000 jobs in the mortgage 
industry were cut due to the meltdown in the subprime sector.  David Ellis, Job Cuts from Subprime: 
18,000 and Counting, CNNMONEY, Aug. 23, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/22/news/ 
economy/subprime_layoffs/index.htm.  Some economists predict that additional job losses will be seen 
in housing-related industries.  Home Depot ―blamed the housing-market softness and turmoil in the 
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ciated with foreclosures, and the recent increase in the sheer number of fo-
reclosures taking place, there is a dire need for the federal government to 
enact legislation that will give consumers the ability to protect themselves 
from the types of home loans that most often lead to foreclosure.24 
The federal government should enact legislation requiring borrowers 
to participate in a consumer education program before borrowers can 
commit to loans containing adjustable interest rates,25 prepayment penal-
ties,26 balloon payments,27 that does or has the potential to negatively 
amortize,28 or where points and fees will be financed along with the prin-
cipal.29  These terms, once mainly attributed to predatory loans, are now 
prevalent in many of today‘s subprime loans.30  It has been argued that 
―[p]redatory lending is made possible by inadequate information, or, in 
technical jargon, asymmetric information held by lenders and borrowers 
. . . . Predatory lending would not exist, or would be relatively rare, if pros-
pective borrowers understood the true nature of their loan contracts.‖31  
Logically, it seems to follow that the use of loan terms typically associated 
with predatory lending are also present in subprime loans due to unequal 
knowledge possessed by borrowers and lenders.32  Providing borrowers 
with this education would give them the tools needed to correctly assess 
risks associated with these terms and allow them to make informed deci-
sions.  Furthermore, pre-purchase mortgage counseling has been shown to 
reduce the number of delinquent mortgage payments.33 
Part I of this Comment explores prime, subprime and predatory loans, 
lays out why securitization has played a large role in the recent dramatic 
increase in subprime loans, and discusses blurring of the distinction be-
tween legitimate subprime and predatory loans.  Part II continues with an 
 
subprime market for its drop in second-quarter profits.‖  Id.  General Motors also cites a weakened 
housing market for the reduced demand for their ―full-size pickup trucks and SUVs.‖  Id. As a result, 
General Motors has cut back on overtime available for its plant employees.  Id.  ―Problems could spread 
to other retail segments, warns John Silvia, chief economist with Wachovia.  Consumers faced with 
high interest rate mortgages are likely to cut back on spending.  Without customers, retailers could be 
forced to trim their headcount.‖  Id. 
 24 Though there is a need for the federal government to address foreclosures currently taking 
place, the purpose of this Comment is how to prevent this type of foreclosure epidemic from taking 
place again in the future. 
 25 An adjustable rate mortgage, or ARM, is a mortgage where the interest rate will change period-
ically over the life of the loan.  HUD.gov, Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM): What is an ARM?, 
http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/ins/203armt.cfm (last visited April 5, 2008).  See infra Part I.B.1. 
 26 See infra Part I.B.4. 
 27 See infra Part I.B.5. 
 28 See infra Part I.B.6. 
 29 See infra Part I.B.2. 
 30 See infra Part I. 
 31 Governor Edward M. Gramlich, Remarks at the Fair Housing Council of New York, Syracuse, 
New York (Apr. 14, 2000), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/Speeches/2000/ 
200004142.htm. 
 32 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 33 ABDIGHANI HIRAD & PETER M. ZORN, A LITTLE KNOWLEDGE IS A GOOD THING: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRE-PURCHASE HOMEOWNERSHIP COUNSELING (2001), available 
at http://freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/pdf/homebuyers_study.pdf. 
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assessment of the current federal legislation in place to help protect bor-
rowers from predatory lending practices.  Next, Part III surveys North Car-
olina, New Jersey and Illinois‘ predatory lending laws, all of which require 
consumer education for certain loans, and considers the success of these 
laws.  This Comment then moves to propose a consumer education re-
quirement when specific terms are included in a mortgage and discusses 
how to implement this requirement in Part IV, recommending that lenders 
be required to show proof that a borrower has completed the mandatory 
consumer education before the lender is allowed to securitize the borrow-
er‘s loan.  This Comment concludes with the story of Mr. Alvaro Cortez, a 
man who benefited from Illinois‘ consumer education requirement, and 
proves that consumer education can help in the fight against abusive loan 
terms which lead to foreclosure. 
I.  AS TIME HAS PASSED, THE LEGITIMATE SUBPRIME MARKET 
HAS TAKEN ON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PREDATORY MARKET, 
BLURRING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TWO 
Not long ago, there were ―three markets for home mortgages: a prime 
market, a legitimate subprime market, and a predatory market.‖34  The 
prime market35 is, and always has been, for borrowers who have good cre-
dit histories and present relatively low risks of defaulting on their loans.36  
The legitimate subprime market made credit available for people who gen-
erally had lower credit scores37 or for other reasons could not qualify for a 
prime mortgage.38  Since these borrowers had less than perfect credit, lend-
 
 34 Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of 
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2002). 
 35 ―‗Prime‘ loans are those made to ‗low-risk borrowers with strong credit histories.‘‖  David J. 
Weiner, Comment, Assignee Liability in State Predatory Lending Laws: How Uncapped Punitive Dam-
ages Threaten The Secondary Mortgage Market, 55 EMORY L.J. 535, 538 (2006) (quoting Engel & 
McCoy, supra note 34, at 1258).  Because prime loans are made to borrowers with good credit histories, 
mortgage lenders actually compete to offer the best rates and terms to borrowers.  Id.  ―This competition 
has resulted in constantly evolving, innovative loan products as well as sophisticated, automated un-
derwriting processes.  These advances . . . have led to the widespread availability of funds for prime 
borrowers.‖  Id. at 538–39. 
 36 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1258. 
 37 Credit scores are how most lenders assess the risk of a particular loan.  Most lenders look at a 
borrower‘s FICO score, a credit score developed by Fair Issac Corporation.  Each borrower actually has 
three FICO scores, one for each of the three credit bureaus—Experian, TransUnion and Equifax.  A 
borrower‘s FICO score is based on the following factors, and their relative weight to the overall score is 
indicated in parentheses: payment history (35%), amounts owed (30%), length of credit history (15%), 
new credit (10%), and types of credit used (10%).  FICO scores affect the amounts that lenders are will-
ing to lend and on what terms they are willing to do so.  MyFICO.com, http://www. 
myfico.com/CreditEducation (last visited Mar. 22, 2008). 
 38 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1258; see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 650–51 (―A 
subprime loan is typically intended to extend credit to a borrower who, for reasons such as a poor credit 
record, high debt-to-income ratio, or unstable employment history, cannot qualify for a conventional or 
prime mortgage loan.‖).  The legitimate subprime mortgage market ―provides a source of funds for cre-
dit-impaired borrowers and other borrowers that are unable to obtain credit in the prime market.‖  
DEPTS. OF TREASURY & HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE 
LENDING 27 (2000), http://www.huduser.org/publications/hsgfin/curbing.html [hereinafter CURBING].  
The subprime market also extends credit to ―creditworthy borrowers with variable or hard-to-document 
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ers believed that they were more likely to default on their loans.39  In order 
to compensate for this increased risk, subprime lenders have traditionally 
charged higher interest rates.40  The predatory mortgage market has been 
described as a subset that grew out of the subprime mortgage market.  
Though most predatory lending takes place within the subprime market,41 
predatory loans are distinct from legitimate subprime loans.42  Predatory 
lenders target borrowers ―who, because of historical credit rationing, dis-
crimination, and other social and economic forces, are disconnected from 
the credit market.‖43  Predatory loans typically exhibit two or more of the 
following qualities: (1) terms that can result in great harm to borrowers,44 
(2) excessive points and fees,45 (3) fraudulent or deceptive lending practic-
es,46 (4) lack of transparency,47 and (5) borrowers‘ waiver of ―meaningful 
legal redress.‖48  The subprime mortgage market has rapidly grown in re-
cent years and now many subprime loans exhibit the qualities that were 
once mainly associated with predatory lending. 
A.   The Boom in Subprime Lending Led to the Birth of the Predatory 
Market 
The subprime mortgage industry has experienced tremendous growth 
since the mid-1990s.  In 1994, the subprime industry accounted for only 
$35 billion of the nation‘s loans originated that year,49 and by 2005 it had 
grown to $665 billion.50  The explosion in the subprime market can be at-
tributed to a number of factors, but most scholars agree that securitization 
 
income.  A subprime mortgage may be a first mortgage (for either purchasing a home or refinancing an 
existing mortgage), a second mortgage, or a home equity line of credit.‖  Id. at 26. 
 39 A common characteristic of subprime lending is higher risk.  ―Lenders experience higher loan 
defaults and losses by subprime borrowers than by prime borrowers.‖  CURBING, supra note 38, at 27. 
 40 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 651 (―Studies have estimated that subprime loans have on 
average a two and a half to four percentage points higher interest rate than prime loans.‖).  Subprime 
loans also tend to have higher points and fees because of the higher origination and servicing costs as-
sociated with these loans.  Id. 
 41 ―Predatory lending generally occurs in the subprime mortgage market . . . .‖  CURBING, supra 
note 38, at 1. 
 42 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1261; Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 650. 
 43 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1279. 
 44 Id. at 1260, 1261–65.  These terms include but are not limited to lending without considering 
the borrower‘s ability to repay the loan, prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and negative amorti-
zation. 
 45 Id. at 1260, 1265–67. 
 46 Id. at 1260, 1267–68. 
 47 Id. at 1260, 1268–70. 
 48 Id. at 1260, 1270. 
 49 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 651–52. 
 50 SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 7.  By 2006, outstanding subprime loans ―account[ed] for about 
14 percent of all first-lien mortgages.‖  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve System, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago‘s 43rd Annual Conference on Bank 
Structure and Competition, Chicago, Illinois (May 17, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20070517a.htm.  ―Subprime mortgages made up 22% of new loans in 
2005, compared to 8% in 2003 . . . .‖  How We Got into the Subprime Lending Mess, KNOWLEDGE@ 
WHARTON, Sept. 19, 2007, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=1812 [hereinafter 
Lending Mess]. 
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of subprime loans for their sale to third-party investors has been the driving 
force behind the market‘s rapid growth.51  Securitization,52 increased avail-
ability of diverse mortgage products, and increased incentives to lend to 
people with low and moderate incomes have all been cited as reasons that 
led to the birth of the predatory lending market.53  The rapid growth in the 
subprime market has also lead to a rapid growth in predatory lending, and 
now many subprime loans exhibit the qualities that were once only found 
in predatory loans. 
B. Characteristics of the Predatory Market Adopted by the Subprime 
Market 
The term ―predatory loan‖ is extremely malleable, and there is no sin-
gle widely accepted definition.54  Occasionally, authors describe predatory 
loans as, ―‗a mismatch between the needs and capacity of the borrower,‘ 
which results in a loan with terms so disadvantageous to a particular bor-
rower that there is little likelihood that the borrower can repay the loan.‖55  
However, not all scholars or regulators agree that this is the definition of a 
predatory loan.56  Some have hesitated to give the term a definition at all, 
 
 51 Securitization is the process through which lenders ―sell mortgages to financial intermediaries, 
who in turn pool mortgages and sell the cash flows as structured securities.‖  Bernanke, supra note 50.  
Securitization began to be widely used ―in the 1980s, and, by 1993, sixty percent of home-mortgage 
loans were securitized. . . . It is now routine for lenders to originate loans and sell them to secondary-
market institutions, which provide[s] a steady stream of capital to lend.‖  Engel & McCoy, supra note 
34, at 1273–74.  For a discussion of the steps in the securitization process, see Eggert, supra note 19, at 
538–41.  Rapid securitization allows lenders to recoup the money they have lent almost immediately.  
Id. at 546. 
The lender can [then] use this infusion of capital to make a new round of loans.  This quick 
churning of loan principal allows even an institution without a great amount of fixed capital 
to make a huge amount of loans . . . . [T]his ability to leverage is particularly useful to 
smaller, disreputable companies that otherwise would have difficulty funding a large num-
ber of loans. 
Id.  Securitization has mostly done away with long-term relationships between lenders and borrowers.  
―In the world of securitization, with its ever churning markets, there are few long term relationships, but 
only the financial equivalents of one night stands.‖  Id. at 551; see Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 
652–53; Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 313–20 (2005). 
 52 ―[T]he practice of selling mortgages to investors may have contributed to the weakening of 
underwriting standards.  [W]hen an originator sells a loan and its servicing rights, the risks (including, 
of course, any risks associated with poor underwriting) are largely passed on to the investors . . . .‖  
Bernanke, supra note 50.  ―About 56 percent of the home mortgage market is now securitized, com-
pared with only 10 percent in 1980 and less than 1 percent in 1970.‖  Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, 
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve System, Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City‘s 
Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, Wyoming (Aug. 31, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/bernanke20070831a.htm. 
 53 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1273–80. 
 54 ―[E]ven defining a core concept of ‗predatory lending‘ has eluded regulators . . . because, as 
with the doctrine of unconscionability, its manifestations are generally context-specific.‖  Azmy & 
Reiss, supra note 19, at 649. 
 55 Lisa Keyfetz, The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994: Extending Liability for 
Predatory Subprime Loans to Secondary Mortgage Market Participants, 18 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
151, 153–54 (2005) (quoting Eggert, supra note 19, at 511). 
 56 Since whether a loan‘s terms are predatory is highly fact specific, when New Jersey adopted 
the Home Ownership Security Act in 2002, the legislature declined to adopt a definition of ―predatory 
lending.‖  Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 649. 
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believing that a set definition could prove to be too limiting, as what may 
be considered predatory in one loan may not be considered predatory in 
another.57  As discussed above, for our purposes, we can define predatory 
loans as loans which typically exhibit two or more of the following quali-
ties: (1) terms that can result in great harm to borrowers58, (2) excessive 
points and fees59, (3) fraudulent or deceptive lending practices,60 (4) lack of 
transparency,61 and (5) terms that require borrowers‘ waiver of ―meaningful 
legal redress.‖62  Examples of mortgage terms which exhibit these qualities 
may include lending without considering the borrower‘s ability to repay, 
financing excessive points and fees, loan flipping, prepayment penalties, 
balloon payments, and negative amortization.63  Many of these terms are 
regularly used in subprime mortgages, and can adversely affect borrow-
ers.64 
1. Lending without Considering Borrowers‘ Ability to Repay Will 
Likely Lead to Foreclosure 
When lenders make adjustable rate subprime mortgages, they only 
consider the borrower‘s ability to repay the loan‘s current monthly pay-
ment.65  The lender does not consider whether the borrower will be able to 
 
 57 Id.; Eggert, supra note 19, at 511–13. 
Defining ‗Predatory lending‘ is difficult because it encompasses many actions that seem, 
on their face, to be indistinguishable from legitimate lending activities.  Predatory lending 
can be divided into two sets of activities.  The first set consists of those activities that are 
either clearly illegal or unconscionable by their very nature.  These per se improper activi-
ties include such actions as misrepresenting the terms of the loans and forging the signa-
tures of borrowers on loan documents. 
The second set of activities that make up predatory lending are those that bedevil the regu-
lators of the lending industry: activities that are legal but, when misused by unprincipled 
lenders, cause borrowers to pay interest rates and fees higher than the market and the bor-
rowers‘ credit rating would justify.  Practices such as balloon payments, adjustable rate 
mortgages, rapid refinancing of existing loans, and even high interest rates and fees could 
be used in non-predatory loans. 
Eggert, supra note 19, at 513.  ―[S]ome community activists have brushed definitional issues aside, rea-
soning that ‗you know predatory lending when you see it.‘‖  Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1260. 
 58 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1260, 1261–65. 
 59 Id. at 1260, 1265–67. 
 60 Id. at 1260, 1267–68. 
 61 Id. at 1260, 1268–70. 
 62 Id. at 1260, 1270. 
 63 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 657–62; Keyfetz, supra note 55, at 155–58; Eggert, supra 
note 19, at 515–22.  In many situations, these terms can be considered predatory when paired with the 
already higher interest rates and points and fees that accompany subprime loans.  Azmy & Reiss, supra 
note 19, at 655. 
 64 See SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 5.  ―Subprime mortgages routinely include features that 
increase the risk of foreclosure.  Such features include adjustable interest rates, balloon payments, pre-
payment penalties, and loans with limited documentation of borrowers‘ loan qualifications.‖  Id. 
 65 In recent years, subprime lenders have predominately offered adjustable rate mortgages 
(ARMs).  ―‗Exploding‘ loans or 2/28s operate as two-year loans that lead to another bad ARM or even 
foreclosure after the introductory teaser rate expires.  Because subprime lenders typically qualify bor-
rowers based on the introductory payment amount, most borrowers cannot afford to remain in these 
arrangements . . . .‖ Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding Homebuyers: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Hous., Transp., and Cmty. Dev., 110th Cong. 5 (2007) (statement of Michael Calhoun, Presi-
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repay the loan when the introductory teaser rate expires, or when the inter-
est rate resets at a higher rate.66  Given that predatory and subprime loans 
are often not first mortgages,67 lenders base the amount of the loan on the 
amount of equity that the borrower has in his or her home.68  This practice 
of ―asset based lending‖69 is likely to lead to default and foreclosure, rob-
bing the borrower of any equity he or she may have accumulated in his or 
her home.70 
2. Financing Excessive Points and Fees Disguises the Cost of the 
Loan 
Predatory and subprime lenders often charge much higher points and 
fees71 than are charged for prime loans.72  In addition to carrying higher 
points and fees, instead of paying for these in cash, many times borrowers 
 
dent, Ctr. for Responsible Lending) [hereinafter Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony], availa-
ble at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/062304-calhoun-housetestimony.pdf. 
 66 The Borrower‘s Protection Act of 2007, proposed by Senators Schumer, Brown, and Casey 
would ―[r]equire sensible underwriting to ensure that the borrower has the ability to repay a loan, taking 
into account payment increases, countering the practice of subprime lenders that underwrite to an artifi-
cially low initial ‗teaser‘ rate . . . .‖  Id. at 8. 
 67 See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 656–57.  ―Over 80% of subprime lending—the market 
within which predatory lending occurs—is not for the purchase of a home but, rather, primarily for 
cash-out refinancings or to consolidate preexisting consumer debt.‖  Id. at 664. 
 68 Id. at 657; see also Azmy, supra note 51, at 309. 
 69 Asset based lending is the ―‗pattern or practice‘ of making mortgage loans based solely on the 
value of the property securing the loan, without considering the borrower‘s capacity to repay.‖  
CURBING, supra note 38, at 5.  Asset based lending is particularly problematic when connected to ad-
justable rate mortgages, which are commonly paired with prepayment penalties.  Ruth Simon, Mort-
gage Refinancing Gets Tougher—As Adjustable Loans Reset at Higher Rates, Homeowners Find Them-
selves Stuck Due to Prepayment Penalties, Tighter Credit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2007, at D1.  In addition 
to the prepayment penalties required when refinancing (which can cost thousands of dollars), when 
housing prices flatten out, lenders tighten their lending standards, making it more difficult for borrowers 
to refinance.  Id. 
 70 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 657; Eggert, supra note 19, at 515.  This problem is amplified 
by the fact that these loans are no longer in the hands of the brokers who made them.  These loans will 
have been securitized and the loan will be in the hands of an investor.  See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 
19, at 657; Eggert, supra note 19, at 515.  In sum, this practice is harmful to investors as well as to bor-
rowers. 
Subprime mortgage brokers, lenders, securitizers, and investors are operating in a market 
that rewards business practices that directly undermine homeowners and sustainable ho-
meownership.  Markets function effectively when transactions are likely to benefit all par-
ties involved, but we don‘t have that situation in subprime lending.  The unfortunate truth is 
that brokers, lenders and investors have reaped enormous gains by originating loans with 
payments that explode in two short years, requiring homeowners, like clockwork, to refin-
ance to a new subprime loan.  Brokers and lenders benefit from this regular and lucrative 
fee income, but homeowners lose the financial benefit of appreciation as their wealth is 
stripped away.  Worse, when appreciation stops and the families cannot sell or refinance 
their homes, these loans bring families to foreclosure and ruin. 
Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony, supra note 65, at 2–3. 
 71 ―Points are fees paid to the lender or broker for the loan . . . . A home loan often involves many 
fees, such as loan origination or underwriting fees, broker fees, and transaction, settlement, and closing 
costs.‖  FederalReserve.gov, Obtain All Important Cost Information, http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
pubs/mortgage/mortb_1.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2008). 
 72 See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 657; Eggert, supra note 19, at 514.  ―Many subprime 
lenders charge fees totaling eight percent of the loan amount or more.‖  Id. 
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finance these points and fees along with the total loan amount.  This means 
that the high interest rate that already applies to the principal amount of the 
loan is now also being applied to the points and fees associated with the 
loan.73  Financing points and fees makes it difficult for a borrower to dis-
cern the loan‘s true cost.74  The practice of ―loan flipping‖ compounds the 
problems associated with excessive points and fees.75 
3.  Loan Flipping Strips Equity from the Borrower‘s Home 
Loan flipping is the practice of repeatedly refinancing a loan ―within a 
short period of time with little or no benefit to the borrower.‖76  Borrowers 
typically have their loans flipped at the urging of a lender in order to lower 
their monthly payments or to consolidate unsecured debt.77  Sometimes 
lenders engage in flipping with the awareness that the borrower cannot af-
ford the terms of the new loan, thereby assuring that the borrower will have 
to refinance the loan again.78  Lenders engage in this practice in order to 
profit from the additional points and fees generated by the new loans.79  
These loans progressively strip the borrower of the equity that he or she 
had accumulated in his or her home.80  This practice is even more unset-
tling because excessive refinancing can trap borrowers in an equity-
 
 73 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 657. 
 74 Id. at 658.  ―Financing points and fees may disguise the true cost of credit to the borrower, es-
pecially for high interest rate loans.‖  CURBING, supra note 38, at 9.  ―Excessive points and fees are 
frequently the hallmark of a predatory loan, and they can disguise the real cost of credit when they are 
financed rather than paid outright at a loan closing.‖  Promoting Homeownership by Ensuring Liquidity 
in Subprime Mortgage Market: J. Hearing Before Subcomm. on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit & Subcomm. on Housing and Community Opportunity, 108th Cong. 5 (2004) (statement of Mi-
chael Calhoun, Gen. Counsel, Ctr. for Responsible Lending), available at http://www.responsible 
lending.org/pdfs/062304-calhoun-housetestimony.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2008).  Though borrowers 
may be able to refinance and escape a high interest rate, homeowners are unable to ever recover exces-
sive fees.  ―Instead, those fees are financed into the loan amount and are repaid from the homeowners‘ 
equity when they refinance.  Furthermore, in the subprime market, . . . homeowners may not learn the 
total fees they are being charged on a loan until the day of closing, if at all.‖  Id. 
 75 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658. 
 76 CURBING, supra note 38, at 73.  See also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 660. 
 77 CURBING, supra note 38, at 73.  Loan flipping also occurs when borrowers cannot make the 
scheduled payments.  Id. 
When a loan is flipped, a borrower refinances on terms that are not economically beneficial 
to him or her, due to the financing of points, fees and prepayment penalties that accompany 
such loans.  A borrower may receive modest additional funds or a slight reduction in the in-
terest rate, but the points and fees that accompany such transactions in the end make the to-
tal transaction more costly to the consumer.  For example, reducing a borrower‘s monthly 
payment by a small amount, say $30 may cost the borrower thousands of dollars in up-front 
costs and interest over the life of the loan.  The high fees derived from flipping attract un-
scrupulous originators who deceive borrowers about the true cost of the loan. 
CURBING, supra note 38, at 74. 
 78 Id. at 74. 
 79 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 660.  It should be noted that ―[l]enders who flip loans tend to 
charge high origination fees with each successive refinancing, and may charge these fees based on the 
entire amount of the new loan, not on just the incremental amount (if any) added to the loan principal 
through the refinancing.‖  CURBING, supra note 38, at 73. 
 80 Id. at 74. 
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stripping cycle.81  If a loan contains prepayment penalties, even more equi-
ty is stripped from the borrower‘s home each time the loan is flipped.82 
4. Hidden Prepayment Penalties Make it More Expensive for a 
Borrower to Refinance 
Prepayment penalties are fees that a borrower is forced to pay if he or 
she pays off or refinances the loan before the end of the term.83  These pe-
nalties are designed to decrease refinancing and early payoffs, which both 
shrink the lender‘s profits.84  Prepayment penalties are often included in the 
amount that is refinanced when a loan is flipped, taking an even bigger 
slice out of the borrower‘s equity.85  It has been estimated that eighty per-
cent of subprime loans carry prepayment penalties, yet less than two per-
cent of prime loans carry these penalties.86  Even more troubling is the fact 
that borrowers are often not aware that the terms of their loans include pre-
payment penalties.87  Similarly, many borrowers are also misled about the 
existence of balloon payments in their loans.88 
5. Balloon Payments can be Used as Leverage to Deplete Borrowers‘ 
Equity 
The term ―balloon payment‖ refers to a lump sum payment that is due 
at the end of the loan term.  This amount is used to pay off the principal 
that the borrower has not yet paid.89  Balloon payments can help borrowers 
secure an initial lower monthly payment, but in predatory loans the balloon 
payment may be due only three to five years after the loan‘s origination.90  
Lenders use upcoming balloon payments as leverage to flip the loan and 
generate additional income for themselves.91  Balloon payments are used to 
begin or continue equity stripping refinancing cycles.92 
 
 81 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 660–61.  ―Once a borrower is trapped in this equity-depleting 
cycle, it becomes increasingly difficult to escape through refinancing with a legitimate lender on favor-
able terms.‖  Id. 
 82 CURBING, supra note 38, at 74. 
 83 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658.  These penalties are very rare in the prime market, but 
seventy percent of subprime loans have prepayment penalties of ―approximately 5% of the total loan 
amount.‖  Id. 
 84 See Eggert, supra note 19, at 518. 
 85 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658.  ―The Center for Responsible Lending (CLR) estimates 
that 850,000 families lose $2.3 billion each year from their home equity wealth because of prepayment 
penalties in subprime loans.‖  DEBBIE GOLDSTEIN & STACY STROHAUER SON, CENTER FOR 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING POLICY PAPER NO. 4, WHY PREPAYMENT PENALTIES ARE ABUSIVE IN 
SUBPRIME HOME LOANS 3 (2003), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/PPP_ 
Policy_Paper2.pdf. 
 86 GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 85, at 2; Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658. 
 87 GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 85, at 8; Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 658. 
 88 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 661.  ―Often, these borrowers were either unaware of the bal-
loon or were given misleading oral assurances that the balloon payments could be easily refinanced.‖  
Eggert, supra note 19, at 519. 
 89 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 661. 
 90 Id.; see also Eggert, supra note 19, at 519. 
 91 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 661; Eggert, supra note 19, at 519. 
 92 See Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 661–62; Eggert, supra note 19, at 519. 
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6. Negative Amortization Strips Equity Before it is Built 
Generally when a borrower makes monthly payments on a loan, that 
payment is used to pay a portion of the principal and a portion of the inter-
est.93  ―In a negatively amortizing mortgage, a consumer‘s regularly sche-
duled payments do not cover the full amount of interest due, causing the 
outstanding principal balance to increase.‖94  In essence, the principal does 
not decrease over the life of the loan,95 and as a result equity is lost each 
month.96 Negative amortization can occur in conjunction with adjustable 
rate mortgages that have caps on the monthly payment amounts.97  As with 
many of the potentially abusive terms discussed above, ―many borrowers 
report that their lenders did not explain how such a loan structure would 
work.‖98 
C. These Terms are the Most Abusive When Borrowers are ―Steered‖ 
into Accepting Them 
Freddie Mac estimates indicate that ten to thirty-five percent of sub-
prime borrowers could have qualified for prime loans.99  Many believe that 
this indicates that many borrowers were ―steered‖ into subprime loans.100  
 
 93 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 662 (―Most loans amortize over the life of the loan with a 
resultant diminution of principal.‖). 
 94 CURBING, supra note 38, at 91. 
 95 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 662. 
 96 Id. 
 97 FederalReserve.gov, Consumer Handbook on Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, http://www. 
federalreserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms_english.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2008). Many adjustable rate mort-
gages ―limit, or cap, the amount your monthly payment may increase at the time of each adjustment.  
. . . Any interest you don‘t pay because of the payment cap will be added to the balance of your loan.‖ 
Id. 
 98 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 662. 
 99 FreddieMac.com, Automated Underwriting Report, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/ 
reports/moseley/chap5.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2008).  ―A recent poll of the 50 most active subprime 
lenders supports this conclusion.  The survey found that up to 50 percent of subprime mortgages could 
qualify as investment-grade mortgages, although some of these loans would fail to meet certain second-
ary market criteria.‖  Id. 
 100 GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 85, at 4.  Disturbingly, it is often minorities being steered into 
these subprime loans.  ―Nationwide, 50% of all loans in predominately African-American neighbor-
hoods are subprime, compared to only 9% in predominately white neighborhoods.‖  Azmy & Reiss, 
supra note 19, at 654–55.  The root of this problem could trace back to when redlining.  ―Redlining—
categorically restricting or precluding residential lending in minority neighborhoods—was openly prac-
ticed by banks and government agencies prior to the Fair Housing Act of 1968.‖  WILLIAM H. SIMON, 
THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT 26 (2001).  Unfortunately, ―[d]espite that 
statute and the subsequent Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1975, studies continue to find that people of 
color, or people who reside in predominately minority neighborhoods, are less likely to have success in 
applying for credit than white people and people in white neighborhoods in otherwise comparable eco-
nomic circumstances.‖  Id at 26–27.  ―Subprime lending is geographically concentrated in the same 
minority neighborhoods once denied access to banks and excluded from federal homeownership pro-
grams because of their racial composition.‖  Benjamin Howell, Exploiting Race and Space: Concen-
trated Subprime Lending as Housing Discrimination, 94 CAL. L. REV. 101, 103–04 (2006).  ―The mi-
nority concentration of the neighborhood is also positively associated with a higher probability of 
receiving a prepayment penalty on a subprime loan.‖  John Farris & Christopher A. Richardson, The 
Geography of Subprime Mortgage Prepayment Penalty Patterns, Housing Policy Debate, 687, 712 
(2004) available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1503_Farris.pdf.  See 
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This is troubling because while the prime market has remained relatively 
unchanged in recent years, the distinction between the legitimate subprime 
market and the predatory market has become extremely blurred.  Today, 
more and more subprime loans carry terms that were once primarily asso-
ciated with predatory loans.  As discussed above, eighty percent of sub-
prime loans carry prepayment penalties,101 a particularly volatile mix con-
sidering that there has been a corresponding rise in adjustable rate 
mortgages.102  When lenders make adjustable rate subprime mortgages 
without the borrower‘s ability to repay at an adjusted rate, most borrowers 
will inevitably have to refinance to be able to afford their monthly pay-
ments and will have to pay the prepayment penalties.103  This disregard for 
the borrower‘s ability to repay also gives lenders increased potential to flip 
the borrower‘s loan. 
D. Lack of Borrower Knowledge Further Blurs the Distinction Between 
Predatory and Subprime Loans 
Traditionally predatory lenders have targeted borrowers that are not 
connected to the credit market in order to exploit the borrower‘s lack of in-
formation.104  The terms discussed above may not independently be preda-
tory, but that caveat quickly disappears when they are imposed on unin-
formed consumers.105  Scholars site the asymmetry of information and 
knowledge between borrowers and lenders as highly problematic.106  Ex-
 
also, Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony, supra note 65, at 9. 
 101 GOLDSTEIN & SON, supra note 85, at 2. 
 102 Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and Interna-
tional Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 99 (2005), available at http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=penniur_papers.  In 2004, adjustable rate mortgages (―ARMs‖) 
accounted for thirty-six percent of the mortgages that year.  This has marked the highest percent of ad-
justable rate mortgages in ten years.  Id. at 99–100. 
 103 Lending Mess, supra note 50.  Many ―[ARMs] carried prepayment penalties making it prohibi-
tively expensive for borrowers to refinance when their payments got too high.  Buyers qualified based 
on the initial low ‗teaser‘ rate, even though they might not be able to shoulder the higher payments that 
could come if the rate adjusted upward.‖  Id. 
 104 Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1271.  ―These homeowners tend to be very unsophisticated 
about mortgage products and largely disconnected from the financial services market.‖  Azmy & Reiss, 
supra note 19, at 656. 
 105 Stark, supra note 9, at 145.  Consider: 
[I]f the borrower is planning to move and sell the home in three years, then a loan with a 
balloon payment due in five years should not be problematic.  If the borrower is taking 
classes at night and working during the day but expects to graduate and has a high-paying 
job waiting for her in a year, then a loan that accrues interest at a higher rate than it is pay-
able at for a one-year period (causing negative amortization) would not be problematic and 
may best suit that particular borrower‘s needs. 
Id. 
 106 See, e.g., Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1271; Memorandum from Richard K. Green & 
Susan M. Wachter, on The Housing Finance Revolution to the Federal Research Bank of Kansas City‘s 
31st Economic Policy Symposium in Jackson Hole, Wyo. 34–35, 38–41 (Aug. 31, 2007), available at 
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2007/PDF/2007.08.21.WachterandGreen.pdf.  In a re-
cent study published by the Woodstock Institute, an alarming thirty-four percent of borrowers did not 
know whether their loans carry a fixed or adjustable interest rate.  Many Borrowers Unaware of Mort-
gage Interest Rate Details; Foreclosures Affect Neighbors, Too, WOODSTOCK DEV. (Woodstock Inst., 
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ploitation of unequal knowledge and information is becoming equally prob-
lematic in the subprime industry,107 and this has caused many subprime 
loans to have the same ending as their predatory counterparts—
foreclosure.108 
II.  CURRENT FEDERAL LEGISLATION HAS NOT BEEN ENOUGH TO 
PROTECT BORROWERS 
A. The Truth in Lending Act 
In 1968, the federal government enacted the Truth in Lending Act 
(―TILA‖)109 ―as title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. . . . TILA, 
implemented by Regulation Z (12 CFR 226), became effective July 1, 
1969.‖110  TILA was passed in order to ensure that lenders disclose credit 
terms to borrowers in a way that allows them to compare the terms of credit 
that they have been offered.111  TILA requires that the lender disclose cer-
tain terms to the borrower including the amount financed, finance charges, 
the annual percentage rate (―APR‖), a statement whether the payments may 
―increase or decrease dramatically,‖ and the total number of payments.112 
 
Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2007, at 1, available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/publications/woodstock-
developments-newsletter. 
 107 Kenneth R. Harney, Mortgage Forms Sow Confusion, WASH. POST, June 23, 2007, 
http:www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/22/AR2007062200867_pf.html).  
―Many borrowers simply do not understand their mortgages—especially subprime loans that come with 
complex features and costly penalties.‖  Id. 
In a series of intensive interviews . . . researchers also found that ‗many borrowers were 
confused by the current . . . mortgage cost disclosures‘ . . . . 
Many had loans that were significantly more costly than they believed, or contained signif-
icant restrictions, such as prepayment penalties, of which they were unaware. 
Id.; see also FED. TRADE COMM‘N, BUREAU OF ECON. STAFF REPORT, IMPROVING CONSUMER 
MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT AND PROTOTYPE DISCLOSURE 
FORMS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2007) available at www.ftc.gov/os/2007/06/P025505Mortgage 
Disclosureexecutivesummary.pdf [hereinafter IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES]. 
 108 Keyfetz, supra note 55, at 157–58  ―There is a strong connection between the growth and con-
centration of subprime lending and increases in foreclosures—not just in recent weeks, but in recent 
years.‖  What We Need is a Meaningful, National Standard for Mortgage Underwriting, WOODSTOCK 
DEV. (Woodstock Inst., Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2007, at 3, available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/ 
component/option,com_docman/Itemid,260/task,cat_view/gid,98/. 
 109 15 U.S.C.S. § 1602 (2005). 
 110 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, TRUTH IN LENDING: COMPTROLLER‘S 
HANDBOOK 1 (2006), available at http://www.occ.gov/handbook/til.pdf [hereinafter COMPTROLLER‘S 
HANDBOOK]. 
 111 Id. at 4. 
 112 15 U.S.C.S. § 1638 (2005).  It should be noted that TILA does not fully address advertising 
issues that arise in the subprime loan context.  Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of 
Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 129–30 (2007).  McCoy writes: 
Advertisements featuring low introductory rates on variable-rate loans—known as ‗teaser 
rates‘—raise other difficulties that TILA fails to fully resolve.  Under TILA, an advertise-
ment touting a teaser rate must state how long the teaser rate lasts and advise readers that 
the APR could rise after consummation.  However, nothing in TILA requires an ad to de-
scribe the rate increase, its limits, or how it would affect the payment schedule.  This al-
lows lenders to entice borrowers with promises of low interest without revealing how high 
their interest rate could eventually go. 
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B. Home Ownership Equity Protection Act of 1994 
Congress amended TILA to include the Home Ownership Equity Pro-
tection Act of 1994 (―HOEPA‖) in order to help combat predatory lend-
ing.113  HOEPA requires additional disclosures and imposes ―substantive 
limitations on certain closed-end mortgage loans bearing rates or fees 
above a certain percentage or amount.‖114  HOEPA provisions are triggered 
in two cases.  First, HOEPA provisions are triggered when the initial APR 
is 8% higher than the yield on Treasury securities for first-lien mortgages 
with comparable maturity periods, or that are 10% higher for subordinate-
lien mortgages.115  Second, the provisions are triggered when the points and 
fees that the consumer will pay at or before the closing are greater than 8% 
of the entire loan amount or $400.116 
For mortgages subject to HOEPA, some of the disclosures that lenders 
must make to borrowers include: the APR; the amount of regular payments 
and any balloon payments; the total amount borrowed; and for adjustable 
rate mortgages, a statement that the APR and monthly payments may in-
crease.117  ―HOEPA prohibits negative amortization without exception, bal-
loon payments on loans with terms of less than five years, [and] loan terms 
that increase the interest rate in the event of a default . . . .‖118  HOEPA, 
however, does not apply to mortgages used to purchase homes or to home 
equity credit lines, and has been criticized by many consumer advocates 
due to the high amounts required to trigger HOEPA‘s protections.119  These 
high trigger amounts allow many lenders to evade compliance with 
HOEPA by making loans that fall just below the amounts which trigger 
HOEPA‘s protections.120 
As illustrated by the current foreclosure rate, the disclosure require-
ments mandated by HOEPA and TILA are not enough to protect consumers 
or to give them enough information to make informed credit decisions.121  
 
Id. at 129. 
 113 Press Release, Federal Reserve Board, Home Equity Lending Market; Notice of Hearings 
[Docket No. OP-1288] (May 29, 2007), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/ 
20070529b.htm. 
 114 COMPTROLLER‘S HANDBOOK, supra note 110, at 2. 
 115 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2007); see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 666. 
 116 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(ii) (2007); see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 666.  Note, the 
$400, is adjusted annually to reflect inflation.  Id. 
 117 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(c)(1)–(5) (2007). 
 118 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 666. 
 119 Id. at 667; Stark, supra note 9, at 144. 
 120 Stark, supra note 9, at 144.  Stark is also critical of the main protections that the HOEPA offers 
overall.  She claims that these protections are inadequate, citing required disclosures that borrowers do 
not understand or read as an example.  Id.; see Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony , supra 
note 65, at 6–7. 
 121 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 665–68.  ―[TILA] fails to include more obvious and less 
technical disclosures that traditionally unsophisticated victims of predatory lending need. . . . [T]he dis-
closures that TILA does require need only be made at the loan closing . . . .  The disclosures are also too 
confusing where they come included in a bewildering stack of loan documents.‖  Id. at 665–66; see su-
pra note 106. 
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In a recent Federal Trade Commission study of prime and subprime loans 
that met current federal disclosure requirements, two-thirds of borrowers 
did not detect the sizeable penalty that would be incurred for refinancing 
within the first two years.122  Further, a Consumer Federation of America 
study from 2004 concluded that borrowers ―most likely to purchase com-
plex ARMs were among the least likely to understand these products.‖123  
Many states have recognized the inadequacies of the current federal protec-
tions and mandated disclosures, and have enacted their own laws in order 
to curb lending abuses and to fill in the gaps left open by federal law.124 
III.  SOME STATES HAVE ENACTED THEIR OWN LAWS THAT 
REQUIRE CONSUMER EDUCATION IN ORDER TO COMBAT 
PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES 
In 1999, North Carolina was the first state to try to cure the failures of 
the federal legislation and passed its own anti-predatory lending statute.125  
Since then, many states have passed some form of legislation intended to 
curb predatory lending.126  One of the unique features of North Carolina‘s 
law is that it requires consumer education when loans contain certain 
terms.127  Only a handful of states have mirrored the requirement of con-
 
 122 Harney, supra note 107; see generally IMPROVING CONSUMER MORTGAGE DISCLOSURES, su-
pra note 107. 
 123 The Federal Government’s Role in Empowering Americans to Make Informed Financial Deci-
sions Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, the Fed. Workforce, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia of the S. Comm. on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs; 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Insurance Corporation), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spapr3007.html. 
 124 See Christopher R. Childs, Comment, So You’ve Been Preempted—What are You Going to Do 
Now?: Solutions for States Following Federal Preemption of State Predatory Lending Statutes, 2004 
BYU L. REV. 701, 703. 
 125 Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can 
Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 711 (2003). 
 126 Id. at 712–14.  It should be noted that there are federalism and preemption issues associated 
with the states enacting their own anti-predatory lending statutes.  ―The Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (‗OCC‘) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (‗OTS‘) have, via administrative fiat, aggres-
sively pushed preemption of state laws for national banks and savings associations, especially since 
1996.‖  Deanne Loonin & Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt Burdens of 
Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 175 (2007).  This 
had impacted the states‘ abilities to enforce their own predatory lending laws.  ―The preemption rights 
accorded federal depositories by the OTS and the OCC make it very difficult for states to protect their 
consumers from abusive practices in the credit marketplace.  For example, OCC and OTS decisions 
have trumped state anti-predatory lending laws enacted in recent years.‖  Id. at 175–76.  This allows 
―national banks, federal savings associations, and their operating subsidiaries [to] almost completely 
ignore these state laws.‖  Id. at 176.  It should be noted that the application of New Jersey‘s Home 
Ownership Security Act of 2002 is ―preempted by federal law from applying to federal savings associa-
tions.‖  Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of Thrift Supervision, Regarding Preemp-
tion of New Jersey Predatory Lending Act (July 22, 2003), available at http://www.ots.treas. 
gov/docs/5/56305.pdf.  A full discussion of federalism and preemption issues that accompany individu-
al states‘ anti-predatory lending would go beyond the scope of this Comment.  For discussion regarding 
preemption issues with regards to North Carolina‘s predatory lending law, see C. Bailey King, Jr., 
Preemption and the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 377 (2004).  For 
discussion of preemption issues and state predatory lending statutes, see Childs, supra note 124. 
 127 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E(c) (LexisNexis 2007). 
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sumer education in their anti-predatory lending statutes.128  In 2002, New 
Jersey followed North Carolina‘s lead and included a consumer education 
requirement in its Home Ownership Security Act,129 and in 2006 Illinois 
began a pilot program requiring credit counseling for some borrowers.130  
The laws of these three states appear to have varying degrees of success, 
but they all reflect the belief that informed borrowers are important in 
combating abusive lending practices.131 
A. North Carolina was the First State to Recognize the Power of an 
Informed Consumer 
One of the main purposes behind North Carolina‘s anti-predatory 
lending statute is to promote public awareness by providing ―education and 
counseling about predatory lenders.‖132  The North Carolina anti-predatory 
lending statute prohibits a lender from making a high-cost home loan133 
without first receiving certification that the borrower has received home-
ownership counseling.134  Commentators have celebrated North Carolina‘s 
law because it has not impinged on subprime borrowing.135 
 
 128 Consumer education has not been able to show its strengths in combating predatory lending 
because subprime lenders have largely been able to avoid the items that trigger the protection of these 
states‘ acts.  Stark, supra note 9, at 146.  ―Although five states have enacted mortgage counseling re-
quirements for high-cost home loans, because the triggers for this protection are set at such high levels, 
they have become another reform to avoid rather than comply with.‖  Id. 
 129 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(g) (West Supp. 2007). 
 130 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70 (West Supp. 2007). 
 131 See supra notes 31, 32, 107, 162. 
 132 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 332. 
 133 A ―high-cost home loan‖ is defined as a loan where: (1) the principal amount of the loan does 
not exceed the lesser of the conforming loan size limit for a single-family dwelling that is established by 
Fannie Mae, or $300,000, (2) the borrower is a natural person, (3) the debt the borrower incurs is main-
ly for personal family, or household purposes, (4) the loan is secured by either a security interest in a 
manufactured home that the borrower does or will occupy as her principal dwelling, or a mortgage or 
deed of trust on real estate where there is or will be a structure, or structures, designed for one to four 
families‘ occupancy, which is or will be occupied by the borrower as her principal dwelling, and (5) the 
loan exceeds one or more of the thresholds in section 6.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 24-1.1E(a)(4) (Lex-
isNexis 2007). 
 134 ―A lender may not make a high-cost home loan without first receiving certification from a 
counselor approved by the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency that the borrower has received 
counseling on the advisability of the loan transaction and the appropriate loan for the borrower.”  Id. § 
24-1.1E(c)(1). 
 135 ―Without question, North Carolina has reduced predatory lending.  At the same time, evidence 
shows borrowers in North Carolina continue to have access to a wide variety of competitively priced 
loans from a wide variety of lenders.‖  CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, CRL POLICY BRIEF NO. 
10, SUPPORT H.R. 1182: THE PROHIBIT PREDATORY LENDING ACT 1 (2005), available at http:// 
www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pb010-MillerWattFrank-0305.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).  The 
anti-predatory lending statute has not reduced the number of subprime loans made in North Carolina, in 
fact, ―North Carolina had 15% more subprime home loans per capita than the rest of the nation as a 
whole in 2000.‖  Id. at 2.  ―[T]he subprime market behaved essentially as the law intended: There was a 
reduction in predatory loans but no change in the cost of subprime credit or reduction in access to credit 
for high-risk borrowers.‖  Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of North Carolina‘s Anti-Predatory 
Lending Law: A Descriptive Assessment 1 (June 25, 2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
Ctr. for Cmty. Capitalism, Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill), available at http://www.responsiblelending. 
org/pdfs/PredLendingStudy.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2008).  It should be noted that North Carolina‘s 
statute prohibits high cost home loans from carrying any of the following terms: (1) No call provisions 
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It should be noted that recent statistics show that North Carolina has 
not been able to dodge the foreclosure wave that has hit the rest of the na-
tion.136  The number of foreclosures in North Carolina has not been attri-
buted to the failure of consumer education programs, and may be con-
nected to the thresholds which must be met in order to trigger the statute‘s 
provisions.137  In fact, the North Carolina Justice Center still recommends 
that ―investment . . . in programs designed to promote responsible ho-
meownership, such as housing counseling and financial literacy‖ be consi-
dered in order to fight against the problem of increased foreclosures in 
North Carolina.138 
B. New Jersey Included a Consumer Education Requirement in the Home 
Ownership Security Act of 2002 
New Jersey sought to combat the state‘s high concentration of preda-
tory lending by enacting the Home Ownership Security Act of 2002.139  
The Act ―bans numerous additional loan terms when made in connection 
with High-Cost Home Loans,[140] such as balloon payments, negative 
amortizations, and default interest rates, while also mandating clear disclo-
sures and, in certain cases, loan counseling.‖141  New Jersey requires loan 
counseling142 when a borrower will be financing points and fees in connec-
 
that allow the lender to unilaterally to accelerate the borrower‘s indebtedness, (2) No balloon payments 
that exceed the sum of two average earlier scheduled payments, (3) No negative amortization, (4) No 
increased interest rate triggered by default, (5) No advance payments, (6) No modification or deferral 
fees, (7) No lending without lender‘s reasonable belief that the borrower will be able to repay the loan, 
(8) Fees and charges may not be directly or indirectly financed, (9) Lender may not charge additional 
points and fees when refinancing an existing high-cost home loan held by the same lender.  N.C. GEN. 
STAT. Ann. § 24-1.1E(b)–(c) (LexisNexis 2007). 
 136 In 2006, there were 46,512 foreclosures filed in North Carolina.  ―This level represents an in-
crease of over 173 percent from the 16,630 filings in 1998.‖  Al Ripley, A Good Session Addressing 
Foreclosure: But More Work Remains, N.C. JUST. CENTER COMMUNITY NEWS, Fall 2007, at 6, availa-
ble at http://www.ncjustice.org/assets/library/1072_cnfall2007.pdf.  Data also shows that the number of 
foreclosures in 2007 will surpass those of 2006.  ―Many experts predict that nationwide the height of 
the crisis will not peak until 2008 or 2009 . . . .‖  Id.  The record number of foreclosures has sent North 
Carolina legislators back to the drawing board to search for a way to combat predatory lending.  In 
2007, the General Assembly of North Carolina passed House Bill 1817 ―to protect North Carolinians 
from predatory mortgage lending practices that increase foreclosure.‖  Id. 
 137 Stark argues that, like HOEPA, the triggers for the statute‘s protection are set so high that 
lenders can avoid compliance with the statute.  Stark, supra note 9, at 146. 
 138 Hearing on Home Foreclosures Before the H. Select Comm. on Rising Home Foreclosurses, 
2005–09 Reg. Sess. (N.C. Feb. 28, 2006) (statement of Carlene McNulty, Staff Attorney, N.C. Just. 
Ctr.) available at http://www.ncjustice.org/assets/library/670_ncjcforeclosepres.pdf. 
 139 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(g) (West Supp. 2007); see also Azmy & Reiss, supra note 
19, at 649. 
 140 The statute defines a ―High-cost home loan‖ as a loan where the principal amount does not 
exceed $350,000, ―which. . . shall be adjusted annually to include the last published increase of the 
housing component of the national Consumer Price Index, New York-Northeastern New Jersey Region, 
in which the terms of the loan meet or exceed one or more of the thresholds as defined in this section.‖  
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-24 (West Supp. 2007). 
 141 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 671–72; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-26(a)–(g) (West 
Supp. 2007). 
 142 It should be noted that there is a difference between consumer education and consumer coun-
seling.  ―Counseling is specific and is tailored to the particular needs of the individual, while education 
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tion with a High-Cost Home Loan.143  While consumer counseling is only 
required for loans where borrowers will be financing points and fees, credi-
tors can not make any High Cost Home Loan without the borrower first 
signing a notice that urges the borrower to contact a credit counselor.144  
Scholars projected that the Home Ownership Security Act would curb the 
―worst abuses of predatory lending while preserving the availability of cre-
dit to all New Jersey consumers who need it.‖145  Unfortunately, New Jer-
sey has also been unable to avoid a growing number of foreclosures in re-
cent years.146  Despite the growing number of foreclosures, the New Jersey 
Department of Banking and Insurance continues to focus on the importance 
of an educated and informed public.147 
C. Illinois Enacted Legislation that Requires Mandatory Counseling for 
Certain Loans  
Illinois enacted House Bill 4050148 in an attempt to ―eradicate predato-
ry lending practices.  HB 4050 [was] designed to increase homeowner‘s 
knowledge about the loans they are considering and to reduce the number 
of foreclosures resulting from overly expensive homes.‖149  The statute 
provides that brokers or loan originators of mortgages on residential prop-
erties within the pilot program area,150 must submit the information re-
 
typically is  administered in a generic program.‖  HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 33, at 5. 
 143 § 46:10B-26(g).  The New Jersey legislature found that ―[t]he financing of points and fees in 
these loans provides immediate income to the originator and encourages the repeated refinancing of 
home loans.‖  § 46:10B-23(a).  Identifying the connection between the financing of points and fees and 
repeated refinancing, a known predatory term as discussed above, may have motivated the legislature to 
require consumer counseling with respect to this loan term. 
 144 ―You [the borrower] should consult an attorney-at-law and a qualified independent credit 
counselor or other experienced financial advisor regarding the rate, fees and provisions of this mortgage 
loan before you proceed.  A list of qualified counselors is available by contacting the New Jersey De-
partment of Banking and Insurance.‖  § 46:10B-26(f) (original in all caps). 
 145 Azmy & Reiss, supra note 19, at 670. 
 146 Based on the number of homes in the state in May 2007, New Jersey had the fifteenth highest 
number of foreclosures in the country—approximately ―one foreclosure filing for every 843 house-
holds . . . .‖  Kathleen M. Howley, U.S. Mortgage Foreclosure Filings Rise 90% in May, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, June 12, 2007, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid= 
av3bqU7edFDs&refer=home.  This statistic was drawn from information provided by RealtyTrac, Inc.  
Id. 
 147 The Department of Banking and Finance announced in September 2007 that it would be 
launching additional education and counseling programs to address and prevent foreclosures.  Commis-
sioner Steven M. Goldman stated, ―Educating and informing the public is the best defense against busi-
ness arrangements with potentially catastrophic consequences.‖  Press Release, State of New Jersey 
Department of Banking and Insurance, DOBI Announces Public Forums, Education Plan to Address 
Mortgage Lending Issue: Focus on Consumer Education, Foreclosure Prevention (Sept. 26, 2007) 
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/pressreleases/pr070926.htm. 
 148 H.B. 4050, 94th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005). 
 149 HB4050info.com, Homepage, http://www.hb4050info.com/Public_Web/home.aspx (last vi-
sited Mar. 25, 2008). 
 150 The ―Pilot Program Area‖ is defined by statute as ―all areas within Cook County designated as 
such by the Department [of Financial and Professional Regulation] due to the high rate of foreclosure 
on residential home mortgages that is primarily the result of predatory lending practices.‖  765 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70(a) (West Supp. 2007).  Originally the pilot program area consisted of ten zip 
codes in Cook County.  HB4050info.com, Introduction to the Predatory Lending Database Pilot Pro-
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quired by statute151 to the predatory lending database established and admi-
nistered by the Secretary of the Department of Financial and Professional 
Regulation (―DFPR‖)152 within ten days of taking a mortgage applica-
tion.153  After reviewing the information, the DFPR will issue a ruling with-
in seven days, stating whether the borrower must undergo mandatory credit 
counseling.154 
Though foreclosure rates in Illinois and Cook County still remain 
high,155 HB 4050 only went into effect on January 1, 2006.156  Since the 
statute did not go into effect until then, many of the loans that led to the fo-
reclosures in 2007 were not subject to the statute.157  Further, it should be 
 
gram, available at https://www.hb4050info.com/pdfs/HB4050_intro.pdf.  However, after receiving in-
formation that suggested that this designation ―may be detrimental to the Pilot Program‘s purpose, 
namely, to curb predatory lending practices in areas with high rates of foreclosure on residential home 
mortgages[,]‖ the Secretary of the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (the ―Secre-
tary‖) withdrew that designation.  Press Release, Illinois Dept. of Fin. & Prof‘l Regulation, Re-
Designation of Pilot Program Area Pursuant to Public Act 94-280 (HB 4050) (Jan. 19, 2007), 
https://www.hb4050info.com/pdfs/4050Scan001.pdf.  The Secretary withdrew the designation and des-
ignated that the Pilot Program Area had no areas or zip codes.  Id.  Some critics had claimed that the 
originally designated area was a result of racism.  See Amy Merrick, Illinois Tries New Tack Against 
Predatory Loans: Its First Effort Drew Charges of Racism; Mortgage Brokers Revolt, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 21, 2007, at A1.  A further examination of this claim goes beyond the scope of this Comment. 
 151 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/72 (West Supp. 2007).  The information required includes in-
formation about the borrower, such as name, address, social security number, the mortgage‘s interest 
rate and related material terms, information about the loan originator or employer including license 
number and fees being charged to the borrower as well as ―[a]ll information indicated on the Good 
Faith Estimate and Truth in Lending statement disclosures given to the borrower by the broker or origi-
nator.‖  Id. § 77/72(6). 
 152 § 77/70(b). 
 153 § 77/70(c). 
 154 Id.  The law requires that the Department create a database for the loan applications that it 
receives.  The database would collect information from all of the loans issued in the Pilot Areas.  ―Un-
der the program, mortgage companies and brokers must enter information about the borrower and the 
borrower‘s loan into the Internet-based database.  This database will be able to automatically analyze 
the details of each loan and determine if the loan agreement meets credit counseling standards set by the 
Department.‖  Press Release, Governor‘s Office, Gov. Blagojevich Signs Law to Protect Homebuyers 
in At-Risk Communities From Predatory Lenders (July 21, 2005), http://www.illinois. 
gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectID=3&RecNum=4166 [hereinafter Press Release, 
Law to Protect Homebuyers].  The determination shall be based on the Department‘s comparison of the 
information provided and the Department‘s credit counseling standards.  Id.  If the Department deter-
mines that the borrower must undergo counseling, this requirement may not be waived by the borrower.  
Id. 
 155 From January to June of 2007, there were 42,998 foreclosures filed in Illinois, one for every 
120 households.  Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, Foreclosure Activity up Over 55 Percent in the First 
Half of 2007 (July 30, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx? 
ChannelID=9&ItemID=2932&accnt=64847.  ―Cook County reported 3,721 foreclosure filings in May 
[2007], a 27 percent decrease from the previous month but still the most of any county in the [Chicago] 
metro area.‖  Press Release, RealtyTrac.com, Chicago Foreclosure Activity Decreases 20 Percent in 
May (June 30, 2007), http://www.realtytrac.com/ContentManagement/pressrelease.aspx?ChannelID= 
9&ItemID=3011&accnt=64847.  ―The county‘s foreclosure rate of one foreclosure filing for every 563 
households was sixth highest among metro counties and 1.2 times the national average.‖  Id. 
 156 See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70 (West Supp. 2007). 
 157 Many of the foreclosures that are occurring now are due to the interest rates of ARMs being 
reset.  See supra notes 12, 17 and accompanying text; SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 5.  Until recently, 
2/28 ARMs were the most common type of subprime loan.  Holden Lewis, Popular 2/28 Mortgages are 
No More, BANKRATE.COM, July 26, 2007, http://biz.yahoo.com/brn/070726/22748.html?.v=1.  ―A 2/28 
subprime ARM has a low initial rate that lasts two years.  After that, the loan resets, which means that 
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noted that HB 4050 was enacted after, and in response to, the large number 
of foreclosures in Cook County.158  In fact, HB 4050 was an attempt to curb 
the number of foreclosures and help families harmed by loans that they did 
not understand.159 
D. These Laws Strive to Give Borrowers the Knowledge Necessary to 
Avoid Abusive Loan Terms 
Though foreclosure statistics since the enactment of North Carolina, 
New Jersey, and Illinois‘ respective anti-predatory lending statutes may not 
initially indicate success, these states are definitely on the right track.160  In 
the Center for Responsible Lending‘s 2006 report assessing state predatory 
lending laws, New Jersey and North Carolina were listed among the states 
with the strongest predatory lending laws.161  Consumer counseling and 
education is aimed at curing the problems caused by unequal information 
and knowledge possessed by borrowers and lenders.162  These states aim to 
provide borrowers with the knowledge they need to avoid abusive loan 
terms while still allowing borrowers to make the ultimate decision about 
how to invest.163 
Eleven HUD certified counseling agencies participated in the HB 
4050 Predatory Lending Database Pilot Program during the twenty-week 
period between September 1, 2006 and January 19, 2007.164  In the Pilot 
Program‘s twenty weeks, about 1,200 borrowers received credit counsel-
ing, or a ―File Review,‖ from a HUD-certified counseling agency.165  ―The 
overwhelming majority of borrowers who were receiving adjustable-rate 
 
the rate is adjusted upward or downward.  At the first jump, the rate can conceivably climb 2 to 6 per-
centage points, causing monthly payments to skyrocket.‖  Id. 
 158 In 2003 Cook County had more foreclosures than any other U.S. county.  Sarah Max, The Next 
Big Trend: Foreclosure, CNNMONEY.COM, Feb. 5, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/2004/02/04/pf/ 
yourhome/foreclosures/index.htm. 
 159 Press Release, Law to Protect Homebuyers, supra note 154.  ―A recent analysis by The Chica-
go Reporter, an investigative newsmagazine, found that the Chicago area ranks first among United 
States metropolitan areas in the number of subprime loans issued to homeowners from 2004 through 
2006.‖  Morgenson, supra note 1. 
 160 See supra notes 137, 155–159 and accompanying text (discussing potential reasons why North 
Carolina and Illinois‘ statutes may have failed to produce a decrease in the numbers of recent foreclo-
sures). 
 161 Wei Li & Keith S. Ernst, The Best Value in the Subprime Market: State Predatory Lending 
Reforms, CRL REPORT (Ctr. Resp. Lending, Durham, N.C.), Feb. 23, 2006, at 7, available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/rr010-State_Effects-0206.pdf.  States were evaluated using 
HOEPA‘s protections as a baseline and then by considering six aspects of a ―typical subprime loan: (1) 
types of loans covered, (2) treatment of points and fees, including covered charges and amount of 
charges that activate high-cost protections, (3) prepayment penalties, (4) anti-flipping rules, (5) substan-
tive protections applicable to high-cost loans, and (6) remedies available to borrowers.‖  Id. at 6. 
 162 See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
 163 ―Nothing in this Article is intended to prevent a borrower from making his or her own decision 
as to whether to proceed with a transaction.‖  765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/70(i) (West Supp. 2007). 
 164 Findings From the HB 4050 Predatory Lending Database Pilot Program, HOUSING ACTION 
ILL. (Housing Action Illinois, Chicago, Ill.), Apr. 4, 2007, at 1, available at http://www. 
housingactionil.org/downloads/HB4050Findings.pdf [hereinafter Findings HB 4050]. 
 165 Id. 
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loans were surprised when the HUD-certified Counseling Agency informed 
them that they were receiving an adjustable-rate loan and not a loan with a 
fixed rate for the entire term of the loan.‖166  The counseling agencies‘ re-
search indicates that borrowers who received counseling were better able to 
―understand the costs and terms of their loans, leading to better-informed 
decision-making.‖167  These findings correspond with those in a 2001 
study, which found that pre-purchase mortgage counseling is effective in 
reducing the number of delinquent mortgage payments.168 
IV.  THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD ENACT FEDERAL 
LEGISLATION REQUIRING CONSUMER EDUCATION WHEN A 
MORTGAGE CONTAINS CERTAIN TERMS 
The federal government should enact legislation requiring borrowers 
to participate in a consumer education program before borrowers can 
commit to a loan that contains an adjustable interest rate, prepayment pe-
nalties, or balloon payment(s); a loan that does, or has the potential to, ne-
gatively amortize; or a loan in which points and fees will be financed along 
with the principal.169  Requiring borrowers to complete a consumer educa-
tion program will give borrowers the tools necessary to understand the 
meaning of each of these terms, as well as their potential benefits and dan-
gers.  At the completion of all consumer education programs, extra one-on-
one counseling should be made available to all borrowers who desire addi-
tional assistance in understanding the terms of their loans.  The federal 
government forces subprime lenders to face an educated consumer by re-
quiring consumer education when these terms are present.170  Giving bor-
rowers information and education will help to eliminate the asymmetry of 
knowledge between borrowers and lenders, which has been cited as one of 
 
 166 Id. at 3.  It appears that when lenders told borrowers that the term of the mortgage was fixed 
they did not reveal that the term was only fixed for a short amount of time.  ―Truth in Lending Act 
(TILA) disclosures do not adequately disclose this to the unsophisticated borrower. . . . Most borrowers 
also did not understand that they were being charged substantial fees/costs for the loan.‖  Id. at 4. 
 167 Id. at 1. 
 168 HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 33, at 3. 
 169 It has been argued that, ―it is important to emphasize that prevention, including counseling and 
education, is never a substitute for strong regulation.  Education is not a panacea as long as creditors are 
allowed to push dangerous, unaffordable credit on the most vulnerable.‖  Loonin & Renuart, supra note 
126, at 197; see also Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony, supra note 65, at 7.  It should be 
noted that this Comment does not contend that only consumer education should be used to prevent pre-
datory and abusive loan terms, but merely that its potential for success and inherent strengths should not 
be overlooked. 
 170 State and federal laws have been criticized because the triggers that evoke the laws‘ protections 
are set too high.  Stark, supra note 9, at 144–46.  Triggers further encourage lenders to simply avoid the 
triggers rather than comply with the laws.  Id. at 146.  As Malcolm Bush, President of the Woodstock 
Institute, notes, in calling for national underwriting standards: ―Previous laws failed to prevent the prob-
lems we are now seeing for a very straightforward reason.  The nature of predatory lending is such that 
any attempt to regulate specific products or practices simply serves as an impetus for unscrupulous 
lenders to develop new methods for preying on vulnerable home owners.‖  Malcolm Bush, What We 
Need is a Meaningful, National Standard for Mortgage Underwriting, WOODSTOCK DEV. (Woodstock 
Inst., Chicago, Ill.), Fall 2007, at 3, available at http://www.woodstockinst.org/component/ 
option.com_docman/Itemid,260/task,cat_view/gid,98/. 
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the largest driving forces behind predatory lending practices.171  Moreover, 
having the consumer education requirement tied to specific loan terms ra-
ther than interest rate or fee triggers, helps to ensure that lenders cannot 
avoid compliance.172 
Some have criticized consumer education and counseling because it 
puts the ―burden of the problem on the victim . . . .‖173  This Comment‘s 
proposal should not be viewed as forcing borrowers to shoulder additional 
burdens when taking out loans with certain terms; it should be viewed as 
empowering borrowers by giving them the tools necessary to assess risk174 
and make informed financial decisions.  Exotic mortgages175 should be 
available to consumers who decide to enter into them with full knowledge 
of their potential consequences.176  Federal implementation of a basic con-
sumer education requirement would be most efficient and ensure that all 
states have a basic education requirement.177  This would allow lenders to 
still offer exotic mortgages, but would assist borrowers in making more in-
formed decisions.178  Despite the criticism that has been directed at the con-
sumer education requirement in the bankruptcy system, a consumer educa-
tion requirement for home mortgages would have advantages179 and has 
been shown to help reduce mortgage delinquencies.180  One of the easiest 
ways to ensure compliance with a consumer education requirement would 
be to require that lenders show proof that borrowers have completed the re-
 
 171 Engel and McCoy argue ―that today‘s home-mortgage market is replete with information 
asymmetries that predatory lenders have exploited to the detriment of borrowers who are disconnected 
from the credit market.‖  Engel & McCoy, supra note 34, at 1271.  A twenty-week study of Illinois HB 
4050 conducted by eleven HUD-Certified Counseling Agencies revealed that ―[b]orrowers tend to trust 
what they are told by their loan originator and do not understand what is written in the voluminous dis-
closures given to them.‖  Findings HB 4050, supra note 164, at 3.  ―Additionally, borrowers often oper-
ate under the mistaken presumption that their loan originator has an obligation to obtain the best loan 
and interest rate for them.‖  Id. at 4.  ―Buying or refinancing a home is the biggest investment that most 
families ever make, and particularly in the subprime market, this transaction is often decisive in deter-
mining a family‘s future financial security.  The broker has specialized market knowledge that the bor-
rower lacks and relies on.‖  Ending Mortgage Abuse, Calhoun Testimony, supra note 65, at 8. 
 172 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 173 Stark, supra note 9, at 131.  ―A solution founded on education or counseling puts the onus on 
potential victims to avoid predatory-loan terms, rather than on the perpetrators.  Such reliance is nothing 
more than caveat emptor served up with an informational brochure or loan counseling.‖  Engel & 
McCoy, supra note 34, at 1310–11. 
 174 ―[R]isk means the chance that something different than expected will happen.‖  ERIC A. 
CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 44 (2006).  For borrowers, foreclosure 
should be something different than what is expected to happen when they take out a mortgage. 
 175 Exotic mortgages are mortgages with non-traditional terms, such as adjustable interest rates, 
prepayment penalties, balloon payment(s), negative amortization, or financed points and fees. 
 176 Maxed Out, a documentary on debt in America, begins with a realtor in Las Vegas discussing 
how she had taken out a ―loan to value‖ mortgage to build a large custom home.  She admits that, if the 
―interest rate goes up by the time we move-in in April, I might not be able to afford the house any-
more.‖  MAXED OUT (Magnolia Home Entertainment 2006).  This is a markedly different situation 
from a borrower who has entered into a loan, not even knowing that his/her loan carries an adjustable 
interest rate. 
 177 See infra notes 182–186 and accompanying text. 
 178 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
 179 See infra Part IV.B. 
 180 See HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 33, at 3. 
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quired consumer education before they are allowed to securitize their loans 
and sell them on the secondary market.181 
A. Federal Legislation Should Establish a Baseline for the Consumer 
Education Requirement 
The consumer education requirement proposed in this Comment 
should be federally enacted, but it should only be viewed as a baseline for 
the states to follow.  Though this approach may not be favored by multi-
state lenders due to potential variances between states,182 it is favorable to 
purely federal legislation and to legislation that is left solely to the states 
for a number of reasons.  Implementing the consumer education require-
ment in this manner ensures that all states will have an efficient consumer 
education requirement.183  Further, because the federal legislation provides 
only a baseline, states will be allowed to pass stricter legislation if they be-
lieve it is necessary.  For example, states may add additional terms which 
would also require consumer education.  This allows the states some level 
of freedom to experiment and gives each state the ability to account for its 
individual needs.184  This proposal may be workable as an amendment to 
existing federal law, such as the TILA,185 or it may require an entirely new 
piece of legislation.  In addition to federal implementation of the consumer 
education requirement, the federal government should provide the states 
with federal funds to implement the consumer education requirement.186 
Some of the main concerns of requiring a consumer education re-
quirement are how to fund this education, and how to find and train enough 
educators.187  This Comment proposes that the federal government bear the 
costs of the consumer education programs, since the requirement will be 
federally mandated and cannot be waived by borrowers whose loans con-
tain certain terms.188  One possible way for the government to fund and im-
plement this requirement would be for the federal government to allot an 
additional budget to the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(―HUD‖) for consumer education programs.189 
 
 181 The ease of securitization of loans has led to the boom in the subprime market and the growth 
of predatory lending practices.  See supra Part I.A. 
 182 ―Lenders would prefer a uniform approach . . . because with a uniform law, multi-state lenders 
will have only one set of rules to comply with, making compliance with the law easier and cheaper to 
administer.‖  Stark, supra note 9, at 150. 
 183 Stark argues for a uniform federally enacted mortgage counseling intervention requirement, 
noting that it is preferable to the state-by-state approach, because ―consumer advocates fear that in light 
of the current holders of national office, it is unlikely that as effective a law will be enacted as might be 
enacted by certain states.‖  Id. 
 184 Cf. id. at 150–51 (arguing that a uniform federal requirement would be preferable to a state-by-
state approach). 
 185 Stark‘s article proposes consumer counseling as an amendment to the TILA.  Id. at 150. 
 186 Id. at 141. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 141–42. 
 189 Id. 
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Currently, HUD has already approved housing counseling agencies 
across the country.190  Having HUD develop uniform counseling criteria—
to be adjusted to suit stricter state laws if necessary191—for these already 
approved counseling agencies to adopt, may be one of the easiest and most 
efficient ways for a consumer education requirement to be implemented.  
Though additional educators may still need to be trained,192 the existence of 
an already established network of counselors would cure some of the initial 
burden during the implementation stage of the consumer education re-
quirement.193  This pre-existing network of government-approved housing 
counselors would put a consumer education requirement for mortgages 
steps ahead of the consumer education and counseling requirements in the 
bankruptcy system.194 
B. Though Consumer Education has not been Successful in Bankruptcy, 
it can Succeed in Protecting Borrowers 
In 2005, Congress reformed the bankruptcy system.195  The new law, 
 
 190 For a listing of HUD-approved housing counseling agencies, see HUD.gov, HUD Approved 
Housing Counseling Agencies, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hcs.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 
2008).  There are over 125 approved housing counseling agencies in California alone.  See id. 
 191 Should states enact stricter legislation in addition to the federal legislation, the states should be 
expected to make budgetary contributions to account for the additional counseling that will have to be 
given in that state. 
 192 Since the education requirement cannot be waived, additional counselors who speak languages 
other than English will need to be trained in some locations.  Some of the approved housing counseling 
agencies in the current HUD network offer services in languages other than English, and some do not.  
See HUD.gov, Find a Housing Counselor, http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/hcc/hccprof14.cfm (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2008).  Being able to provide services in languages other than English is of vital impor-
tance in some regions in the United States, particularly considering evidence which shows a correlation 
between a borrower‘s inability to read or speak English and his/her vulnerability to predatory lending 
practices.  See, e.g., C. Lincoln Combs, Comment, Banking Law and Regulation: Predatory Lending in 
Arizona, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 617, 623 (2006).  Combs‘ article notes the trend in Arizona, where the state‘s 
immigrants from Latin America and Mexico have become targets of predatory lending.  One of the 
main reasons that these people have been targeted by predatory lenders is because ―they are often not 
able to read the documents in English that are presented to them to sign . . . .‖  Id. 
 193 During the twenty-week study of Illinois HB 4050 conducted by eleven HUD-Certified Coun-
seling Agencies, there were forty-one counselors trained to provide the Bill‘s required File Review.  
―All borrowers referred for File Review were able to schedule and complete the File Review with a 
participating HUD-certified Counseling Agency within the 10-day statutory time frame.‖  Findings HB 
4050, supra note 164, at 2.  Moreover, ―[t]here were no documented delays in the closing of loans be-
cause of a lack of counselors or delays in providing the File Review.‖  Id. 
 194 See infra notes 206–09 (discussing criticism of the lack of direction given to US trustees re-
garding training and qualification of bankruptcy counselors). 
 195 Loonin & Renuart, supra note 126, at 186.  See also Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 11 U.S.C.).  ―BAPCPA . . . [is] the most substantial revision of bankruptcy law since the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code.  BAPCPA generally became effective as to cases filed on or after October 17, 2005.‖  
Eugene R. Wedoff, Major Consumer Bankruptcy Effects of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 31, 31.  ―By 
the early 2000s, more people filed for bankruptcy each year than suffered a heart attack.  More filed 
bankruptcy than were diagnosed with cancer.  More filed bankruptcy than graduated from col-
lege. . . . Americans filed more petitions for bankruptcy than for divorce.‖  Elizabeth Warren, A New 
Conversation About the Middle Class, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 119, 120 (2007).  Due to the overwhelm-
ing number of Americans filing for bankruptcy each year, BAPCPA was enacted in order to prevent 
abuse of the bankruptcy system and its protections and to make affordable credit more accessible.  Press 
Release, The White House, President Signs Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention, Consumer Protection Act 
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the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 
(―BAPCPA‖), made many significant changes to American bankruptcy 
law.196  One of the major changes BAPCPA made to the Bankruptcy Code 
was the addition of consumer counseling and consumer education require-
ments.197  First, to be able to qualify as a debtor under BAPCPA, individu-
als must now receive consumer counseling, in the form of a briefing, within 
180 days of filing for bankruptcy.198  This briefing can take place in a one-
on-one or group setting, and can be done over the phone or the internet.199  
―Specifically, the credit briefing must outline opportunities for credit coun-
seling, provide a budget analysis, and provide an analysis of financial con-
ditions, factors that caused such financial conditions, and how the debtor 
can develop a plan of action for dealing with the debt without incurring 
negative amortization of debt.‖200  Second, in order to be able to qualify for 
discharge, debtors must also complete a personal financial management 
course.201 
Congress enacted the consumer education and counseling require-
ments of BAPCPA in response to concerns that consumers were filing 
bankruptcy in cases when it was not their only option.202  BAPCPA‘s con-
 
(Apr. 20, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov./news/releases/2005/04/20050420-5.html.  
Scholars and practitioners have expressed doubt that these goals can be achieved through BAPCPA and 
have sharply criticized the law.  ―BAPCPA likely prevents bankruptcy abuse if only because it limits 
the number of people eligible to file for bankruptcy protection.  By reducing the number of overall 
bankruptcy filings, BAPCPA likely curbs abusive bankruptcy filings.  Of course, . . . BAPCPA also 
prohibits good faith filers from obtaining bankruptcy relief, leaving them at the mercy of their creditors 
and state exemption laws.‖  Alan D. Eisler, The BAPCPA’s Chilling Effect on Debtor’s Counsel, 55 
AM. U. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2006).  See generally David K. Stein, Comment, Wrong Problem, Wrong 
Solution: How Congress Failed the American Consumer, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 619 (2007). 
 196 Wedoff, supra note 195, at 31. 
 197 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 109(h), 111 (West 2007). 
 198 § 109(h); see also Wedoff, supra note 195, at 36; Martin & Tama y Sweet, supra note 20, at 
518; Karen Gross and Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Pre-Petition 
Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management Education, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 
549, 550 (2005).  ―Under new § 109(h), individuals are ineligible for relief under any chapter of the 
Code unless, within 180 days of their bankruptcy filing, they received ‗an individual or group briefing‘ 
from a nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency approved by the U.S. trustee or bankruptcy ad-
ministrator . . . .‖  Wedoff, supra note 195, at 36 (quoting 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(1) (West 2007)).  There 
are some narrow exceptions for this requirement set forth in 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(4). 
 199 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(1) (2007); Wedoff, supra note 195, at 36. 
 200 Martin & Tama y Sweet, supra note 20, at 518.  See 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(1)(a) (2007). 
 201 11 U.S.C.A. § 111 (2007); Wedoff, supra note 195, at 37; Gross & Block-Lieb, supra note 
198, at 551.  Some narrow exceptions for this requirement are also set forth in 11 U.S.C.A. §109(h)(4) 
(2007).  ―According to the instructions distributed by The Executive Office of the United States Trustee 
(‗EOUST‘) and memorialized in the Code of Federal Register, the entity charged with administering 
this requirement, the course must cover at least three areas of instruction: budget development, money 
management, and the wise use of credit.‖  Martin & Tama y Sweet, supra note 20, at 519. 
 202 Michael Newman, BAPCPA’s New Section 109(h) Credit Counseling Requirement: Is It Hav-
ing the Effect Congress Intended?, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 489, 489–92.  ―Congress‘s intent in enacting the 
new credit counseling provisions of BAPCPA was thus to encourage individual consumer debtors to 
consider bankruptcy a ‗remedy of last resort,‘ by forcing debtors to learn about the consequences of 
filing bankruptcy and the available non-bankruptcy alternatives.‖  Id. at 490–91.  ―[BAPCPA] contains 
several provisions that seek to improve consumers‘ financial literacy in an attempt to decrease the total 
number of future bankruptcy filings.‖  Id. at 489 (quoting 151 CONG. REC. E685, E704 (2005) (state-
ment of Rep. Moore)). 
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sumer education and counseling requirements have received a great deal of 
criticism for a variety of reasons.  Considering that the debtor is already on 
her way to file her bankruptcy petition, one of the main concerns is whether 
the required briefing203 to obtain debtor status will be effective.204  Further, 
it is argued that this requirement prevents people who would otherwise 
qualify for bankruptcy from being able to file for relief.205 
Another large concern is the lack of direction given to the Executive 
Office of the United States Trustee regarding how to approve the private 
non-profit organizations that have been charged with the task of imple-
menting the mandatory pre-bankruptcy counseling.206  In the past, the credit 
counseling industry was funded by the consumer finance industry, but this 
has ended and, as a result, more aggressive consumer counseling agencies 
have emerged.207  This has led to a litany of potential dangers for consum-
ers who seek the help of these agencies, including ―deceptive marketing, 
high pressure sales efforts, high fees and practices inconsistent with the 
best interests of their consumer customers.‖208  Congress, aware of these 
problems in the credit counseling industry, still decided to require that eve-
ryone seeking to file bankruptcy receive counseling from an approved 
agency.209 
Though the consumer education and counseling requirements of 
BAPCPA have been widely criticized, requiring consumer education or 
counseling for mortgages that carry certain specified terms could avoid 
many of these criticisms.  First, and probably most importantly, the coun-
seling will take place before the borrower enters into the mortgage agree-
ment.210  The timing of pre-purchase counseling distinguishes it from pre-
bankruptcy consumer counseling for debtors.  Pre-purchase counseling for 
borrowers takes place when borrowers still have the ability to decide not to 
enter into a mortgage, which is dramatically different from pre-bankruptcy 
counseling which takes place after consumers have already made credit de-
cisions that have led them to the brink of bankruptcy.211  More importantly, 
 
 203 11 U.S.C.A. §109(h) (2007). 
 204 Martin & Tama y Sweet, supra note 20, at 540.  ―[I]t is highly questionable whether any debtor 
education on the way into bankruptcy will be effective. . . . It is simply too late, at that point, to mea-
ningfully affect any decision a debtor could make.‖  Id. 
 205 ―Given the timing and the stress levels of a person facing financial crisis, the first course serves 
no useful function.  Importantly, this requirement also keeps deserving people out of bankruptcy.‖  Id. 
at 519. 
 206 See Gross & Block-Lieb, supra note 198, at 553–58. 
 207 Id. at 554. 
 208 Id.  Even though these are non-profit agencies, some ―function as virtual for-profit businesses, 
aggressively advertising and selling DMPs [(debt management programs)] and a range of related ser-
vices, maintaining close ties to for-profit firms, [and] reaping high revenues . . . .‖  Id. at 555. 
 209 Id. at 558. 
 210 Timing plays a large role in borrower education and counseling.  Pre-purchase counseling and 
education tends to be ―designed to better prepare families for the responsibilities of homeownership by 
explaining the home buying and financing process, encouraging financial planning and money man-
agement, and going over home maintenance and repair issues and concerns.‖  HIRAD & ZORN, supra 
note 33, at 5. 
 211  
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it has been shown that pre-purchase consumer counseling and education 
does have a significant impact on mortgage delinquency rates.212  Promot-
ing lender compliance is also an integral component to ensuring that con-
sumers are receiving the knowledge necessary to navigate the complicated 
terms in today‘s subprime mortgage market.  One way to prompt lenders to 
adhere to this requirement would be to require proof that the borrower has 
completed the required consumer education program before lenders are al-
lowed to securitize the loan. 
C. Precluding Lenders from Securitizing Loans where Borrowers did not 
Participate in the Required Consumer Education will Promote 
Compliance 
As discussed above, the boom in the subprime market is largely attri-
butable to the rise in securitization of mortgages.213  One of the biggest crit-
icisms of subprime lending is that, due to securitization, loan originators do 
not have a reason to closely scrutinize the loans‘ anticipated future perfor-
mance.214  Since lenders are able to quickly sell their loans on the second-
ary market, lenders have become less concerned with borrowers‘ potential 
future defaults.215  As a result, securitization has led to relaxed underwriting 
standards.216  To prevent abusive lending practices there has been a call for 
 
[I]t is likely that some—perhaps many—debtors‘ financial situations will have so deteri-
orated before they seek prebankruptcy credit counseling that bankruptcy is their only re-
course.  A recent U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study reports that anec-
dotal evidence suggests just that: By the time debtors seek prebankruptcy credit counseling, 
their financial situation is dire enough to allow few alternatives to bankruptcy . . . . 
NOREEN CLANCY & STEPHEN J. CARROLL, PREBANKRUPTCY CREDIT COUNSELING 2 (2007), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/reports_studies/docs/Pre-Bankruptcy_Credit_Counseling 
_Report_Rand.pdf. 
 212 ―Borrowers receiving individual counseling experience a 34 percent reduction in [90-day] de-
linquency rates. . . . [C]lassroom and home study counseling [reduce these delinquency rates by] 26 
percent and 21 percent . . . respectively.‖  HIRAD & ZORN, supra note 33, at 2.  It should be noted that 
the data for this study came from loans originated from 1993 to 1998, and the authors note that, since 
counseling and education techniques have progressed since then, ―[i]t is likely that these changes have 
improved counseling‘s effectiveness, and therefore our analysis likely underestimates the benefits of 
current counseling programs.‖  Id. at 18–19.  Further, unlike BAPCPA, it should be noted that this 
Comment‘s proposal does not allow for telephone or internet education.  Telephone counseling and 
education have not been shown to effectively reduce delinquency rates.  Id. at 18. 
 213 See supra notes 19, 51, 181; see infra notes 214, 216. 
 214 SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 5.  ―Lenders shield themselves from the full potential cost of 
foreclosures by selling their loans to investors through the secondary mortgage market.  Together, third-
party originations and the risk dispersion made possible through the secondary market help distance 
loan originators from seriously adverse consequences of foreclosures.‖  Id.  Securitization also helps 
lenders to avoid legal responsibility for predatory loans.  ―A legal doctrine called the ‗holder in due 
course‘ rule shields [the] loan assignee and ultimately the investors against liability for the predatory 
nature of the loans.‖  Loonin & Renuart, supra note 126, at 178–79. 
 215 Eggert, supra note 19, at 550. 
 216 Id. at 550–51.  ―[S]ecuritization has encouraged the decline of stringent underwriting.‖  Id. at 
550.  The effect that securitization would have on the underwriting standards has been around for some 
time.  In a 1989 article, Edward Pittman wrote, ―Today, approximately half of the private whole loan 
pass-through market is comprised of limited documentation loans.  The increasing use of such loans, 
among other things, has been cited by some commentators as evidence of deterioration in the quality of 
securities that are being created.‖  Edward L. Pittman, Economic and Regulatory Developments Affect-
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more strictly enforced underwriting standards217 and greater investor ac-
countability.218  Requiring lenders to show proof that a borrower has parti-
cipated in the federally mandated consumer education program before the 
lender is able to securitize the loan would help serve these goals. 
If a borrower has completed the consumer education courses, she 
should be in a position to assess the risks of her proposed investment, and 
will have been given the ability to contact an additional counselor if she has 
questions or concerns regarding her loan.  These tools will enable the bor-
rower to make an informed decision as to whether she should enter into a 
particular loan.  If borrowers have undergone this process, then investors 
would be able to invest in mortgage-backed securities knowing that bor-
rowers have assessed the risks of the loan,219 therefore giving investors in-
creased confidence that their investments are not furthering predatory lend-
ing practices. 
If a borrower has not participated in consumer education, the lender 
will be precluded from securitizing the loan.  This will force the lender to 
endure the consequences if the borrower should default on her mortgage in 
the future.  Since it would not be in the lender‘s best interest for the bor-
rower to default on the loan while the lender was still holding it in his port-
folio due to the time and expense related to foreclosure proceedings, lend-
ers would most likely reform underwriting standards or ensure that 
borrowers participate in the required consumer education courses to help 
them understand the terms of their loans. 
 
ing Mortgage Related Securities, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 497, 546 (1989).  Today, scholars are still 
critical of the effects of securitization on underwriting standards.  ―Lax underwriting standards magnify 
the risk of loans that already include high-risk features.  Subprime lenders who market exploding 
ARMs and other high-risk loans often do not adequately consider whether the homeowner will be able 
to pay when the loan‘s interest rate resets, even if rates stay constant.‖  SCHLOEMER, supra note 14, at 
5. 
 217 Bush, supra note 170, at 3. 
 218 ―Investors should take reasonable steps to avoid supporting unsound lending, including refus-
ing to purchase mortgages from lenders who make abusive loans and requiring that subprime lenders 
use appropriate underwriting standards to ensure that borrowers can repay the loan.‖  SCHLOEMER, su-
pra note 14, at 31. 
 219 Moral hazards should be considered.  ―In general, a moral hazard is the risk that a party with 
discretion to act will choose an action that decreases the expected value of the transaction to the other 
party in a way that the other party cannot effectively prohibit.‖  CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 174, at 86.  A 
full discussion of moral hazards and subprime loans would go beyond the scope of this Comment.  But, 
briefly, one might claim that one of the main moral hazards to the lender is that a borrower may not care 
that there is a high probability of foreclosure associated with the mortgage and go through with the 
transaction anyway.  A response to this argument could be that lenders can control this moral hazard by 
tightening their underwriting standards. 
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CONCLUSION 
Consumer education can work.  Illinois‘ law, HB 4050,220 made Mr. 
Alvaro Cortez a believer.221  In December of 2006, Mr. Cortez found his 
dream house and went through the counseling sessions mandated by HB 
4050.222  A loan counselor worked with Mr. Cortez and taught ―him how to 
verify his mortgage‘s terms.‖223  Mr. Cortez believes that his counseling 
―helped him stand up for himself when he went to his closing.  There. . .the 
paperwork showed that he had an adjustable-rate loan, instead of the fixed-
rate one he had been promised.  The interest rate also was higher than he 
agreed to pay.  Mr. Cortez refused to sign.‖224  On Mr. Cortez‘ second clos-
ing date, the loan documents still did not reflect the loan he had been prom-
ised and he refused to sign once again.225  At the third closing, Mr. Cortez 
finally signed loan documents reflecting the loan that he was promised.226 
A federally mandated consumer education requirement would curtail 
abusive lending practices since lenders would not be as easily able to ex-
ploit borrowers‘ lack of knowledge of mortgage terms.  To increase lender 
accountability and ensure their compliance with the consumer education 
requirement, lenders should be required to prove that borrowers have com-
pleted the mandatory education in order to securitize their loans.  If the 
federal government were to implement a consumer education requirement 
for mortgages containing certain terms that have been commonly asso-
ciated with predatory lending and are now prevalent in subprime loans, like 
Mr. Cortez, many borrowers would learn the skills necessary to protect 
themselves. 
 
 220 Codified as 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 77/1, et seq. (West 2007); see also Merrick, supra note 
150. 
 221 Merrick, supra note 150. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
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